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Abstract
Recently, Chen-Hsiang-Shih proposed a new dynamic ID-based remote user 
authentication scheme. The authors claimed that their scheme was more 
secure than previous works. However, this paper demonstrates that their 
scheme is still unsecured against different kinds of attacks. In order to enhance 
the security of the scheme proposed by Chen-Hsiang-Shih, a new scheme 
is proposed. The scheme achieves the following security goals: without 
verification table, each user chooses and changes the password freely, each 
user keeps the password secret, mutual authentication, the scheme establishes 
a session key after successful authentication, and the scheme maintains the 
user’s anonymity. Security analysis and comparison demonstrate that the 
proposed scheme is more secure than Das-Saxena-Gulati’s scheme, Wang et 
al.’s scheme and Chen-Hsiang-Shih.
---------- Keywords: Cryptanalysis, mutual authentication, network 
security, session key agreement, smart cards
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Resumen
Recientemente, Chen-Hsiang-Shih propusieron un nuevo esquema de 
autenticación de usuario remoto basado en un identificador dinámico. Los 
autores afirman que su esquema es más seguro que los trabajos previos. Sin 
embargo, se demuestra que su esquema continúa siendo inseguro contra 
diferentes tipos de ataques. Con el fin de mejorar la seguridad del esquema 
propuesto por Chen-Hsiang-Shih, se propone un esquema que consigue los 
siguientes objetivos de seguridad: el esquema no requiere de una tabla de 
verificación, cada usuario elige y cambia su contraseña libremente, cada 
usuario mantiene su contraseña en secreto, el esquema requiere autenticación 
mutua, el esquema establece una clave de sesión después de una autenticación 
correcta, y el esquema mantiene el anonimato del usuario. El análisis de 
seguridad y la comparación demuestran que nuestro esquema es más seguro 
que el esquema propuesto por Das-Saxena-Gulati, Wang-Liu-Xiao-Dan, y 
Chen-Hsiang-Shih.
---------- Palabras clave: Criptoanálisis, autenticación mutua, seguridad en 
redes, acuerdo de clave de sesión, tarjetas inteligentes
Introduction
A remote user authentication scheme is used to 
authenticate the legitimacy of each user over an 
open network. These schemes not only verify 
the identity of each user but also prevent attacks 
(e.g. server spoofing attack). For that reasons, 
such schemes are the first line of defense against 
adversaries. 
The first remote user authentication scheme for 
an open network was introduced in [1]. The 
scheme is based on a one-way hash function, 
such as MD5 [2] or SHA [3]. Unfortunately, the 
scheme introduced in [1] requires that the server 
stores a password list, making it vulnerable to 
threats of revealing passwords in the directory 
[4] or modifying the verification table [5]. Two 
different schemes have been proposed [6] and 
[7] to remedy the security vulnerability of [1], 
both schemes work without a verification table. 
Then, a remote user authentication scheme with 
smart cards and without verification table was 
introduced in [4]. Since 1991, several remote 
user authentication schemes using smart cards 
[5, 8-18] have been proposed to enhance security 
and reduce vulnerabilities. Later, a dynamic ID-
based remote user authentication scheme was 
proposed in [19]. The concept of dynamic ID 
prevents that an attacker can know the user’s 
identity. However, the scheme is susceptible to 
the following attacks: impersonation [20], insider, 
masquerade, and server spoofing [21]. Moreover, 
the scheme proposed in [19] is insecure, because 
it can work like an open channel and does not 
provide mutual authentication [22, 23]. Since 
the scheme introduced in [19], several dynamic 
ID-based remote user authentication schemes 
[21, 24-39] have been proposed with the attempt 
to reduce security vulnerabilitiRecently, a new 
dynamic ID-based remote user authentication 
scheme has been proposed [21] and the authors 
claimed that their scheme resolves the security 
flaws of [4]. However, the scheme is vulnerable 
to denial of service attack, impersonation attack, 
parallel session attack, password guessing 
attack, and masquerading attack [26, 34, 36, 
38, 40, 41]. In order to increase the security and 
reduce vulnerabilities of the scheme introduced 
in [21] an enhanced version [28] was proposed. 
However, this paper demonstrates that the scheme 
introduced in [28] is still insecure and presents 
a new scheme to overcome all the security 
weaknesses found in [28].
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Review of Chen-Hsiang-Shih’s 
dynamic ID-based remote 
user authentication scheme
A brief review of the scheme proposed in [28] 
is presented. The notations used throughout this 
paper are as follows:
U: User
ID: Identity of U
PW: Password of U
S: Server
x, y: Permanent secret key of S
h(): One-way hash function
hp(): One-way hash function which includes a 
secret code s
||: String concatenation operation
⊗: Exclusive-or operation
Registration phase
This phase is invoked when U desires to be 
registered by S. The process is as follows:
1.  U selects a random number b and computes 
using the equation (1):
 h(b ⊗ PW) (1)
2.  U sends (ID, h(b ⊗ PW)) to S through a 
secure channel
3.  S performs the equations (2), (3) and (4):
 P = h(ID ⊗ x) (2)
 R = P ⊗ h(b ⊗ PW) (3)
 V = hp(h(b ⊗ PW)) (4)
4.  S stores V, R, h(), and hp() in U’s smart card
5.  S sends the smart card to U through a secure 
channel
6.  Finally, U enters b into his smart card
Login phase
This phase is invoked whenever U requests to 
login S. The process is as follows:
1.  U inserts smart card into the smart card 
reader, and keys ID and PW
2.  U’s smart card performs the equations (5) 
and (6):
 P = R ⊗ h(b ⊗ PW) (5)
 hp(h(b ⊗ PW))* ?= V (6)
3.  U’s smart card generates a random number r, 
and performs the equations (7) and (8):
 C1 = P ⊗ h(r ⊗ b) (7)
 C2 = hp(h(r ⊗ b) || TU) (8)
 where TU denotes U’s current timestamp
4.  U’s smart card sends the login request 
message (ID, C1, C2, TU) to S
Verification phase
This phase is invoked when S receives U’s login 
request message. The process is as follows:
1.  If (TS – TU) > DT, where denotes the expected 
valid time interval for transmission delay, 
then S rejects the login request; in other case, 
S continues with the process
2.  S performs the equations (2), (9) and (8):
 P* = h(ID ⊗ x) (2)
 h(r ⊗ b)* = P* ⊗ C1 (9)
 C2
* = hp(h(r ⊗ b)
* || TU) (8)
3.  If C2
* is equal to the received C2, S accepts 
U’s login request and computes the equation 
(10):
 C3 = hp(h(r ⊗ b)
* ⊗ TS || P) (10)
 where TS denotes S’s current timestamp
30
Rev. Fac. Ing. Univ. Antioquia N.° 68. Septiembre 2013
4.  S sends (TS, C3) to U
 Upon receiving the message (TS, C3), U 
carries the following operations:
5.  U verifies either TS is invalid or TS = TU
6.  U computes the equation (10):
 C3
* = hp(h(r ⊗ b)
* ⊗ TS || P) (10)
7.  If C3
* is equal to the received C3, U 
successfully authenticates S
 In addition, U and S compute the session key 
using the equation (11):
 h(r ⊗ b) (11)
Password change phase
This phase is invoked whenever U desires to 
change PW. The process is as follows:
1.  U inserts smart card into the smart card 
reader, keys ID and PW, and requests to 
change password
2.  U’s smart card computes the equations (5) 
and (4):
 P* = R ⊗ h(b ⊗ PW) (5)
 V* = hp(h(b ⊗ PW)) (4)
3.  U’s smart card verifies V* and stored V in 
smart card
4.  If V* and V are equal, U chooses new 
password PWnew
5.  U’s smart card compute Rnew = P
* ⊗ h(b ⊗ PW) 
and V* = hp(h(b ⊗ PW)), and then replaces R, V 
with Rnew, Vnew, respectively.
Cryptanalysis of Chen-Hsiang-
Shih’s dynamic ID-based 
remote user authentication 
scheme
A security analysis of the scheme proposed 
in [28] is presented. The security analysis 
demonstrates that the scheme is still vulnerable to 
an impersonation attack, server spoofing attack, 
and offline secret key guessing attack. In addition, 
the scheme fails to preserve U’s anonymity.
Off-line secret key guessing attack
A legal but malicious user can know P = h(ID 
⊗ x) from R = P ⊗ h(b ⊗ PW) because it knows 
the correct PW. Then, the attacker can guess a 
candidate x* to compute P* = h(ID ⊗ x*) until it 
finds P* equals to P stored in the smart card. If P* 
= P, means that, the intruder found the permanent 
secret key of S.
This attack is possible because S uses the same 
secret key for each user. Moreover, S uses the 
secret key in clear. It is obvious that the security 
of the entire system is compromised.
Impersonation attack
Suppose that a legal but malicious user intercepts 
a login request message (ID, C1, C2, TU) of the 
victim and it knows x. Then, the intruder can 
perform an impersonation attack as follows:
1.  Computes P* = h(ID ⊗ x)
2. Recovers h(r ⊗ b) from C1 computing h(r ⊗ 
b) = P* ⊗ C1
3.  Computes C1
* = P* ⊗ h(r ⊗ b) and C2
* = hp(h(r 
⊗ b) || TU*) where TU* denotes attacker’s 
current timestamp
4.  Sends (ID, C1
*, C2
*, TU*) to S
 Upon receiving the login request message 
from the attacker, S performs the following 
operations:
5.  Since TU* is valid, S computes P
** = h(ID ⊗ 
x), h(r ⊗ b)** = P** ⊗ C1, and C2
* = hp(h(r 
⊗ b)* || TU*). Since the computed result 
C2
** equals the received C2
*, S accepts the 
attacker’s login request.
 This attack is possible because each user 
sends her ID in the login request message. It 
is obvious that the legal but malicious user, 
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who knows the permanent secret key x, can 
easily impersonate any user to login S at any 
time.
Server spoofing attack
A legal but malicious user can impersonate a 
server S performing the following process:
1.  Intercepts the U’s login request message (ID, 
C1, C2, TU)
2.  Computes P* = h(ID ⊗ x), h(r ⊗ b)* = P ⊗ 
C1, and C3 = hp(h(r ⊗ b)
* ⊗ TS* || P
*) where 
TS* denotes attacker’s current timestamp
3.  Sends (TS*, C3) to U
Upon receiving the message (TS*, C3), U computes 
and verifies C3. Because the attacker used the 
correct secret key x and h(r ⊗ b), U thinks that 
the message send by S is correct.
User’s anonymity
Chen et al.’s scheme does not preserve the 
anonymity of U. In the verification phase, each U 
sends (ID, C1, C2, TU) to S over insecure channel. In 
this case, the privacy of U is not preserve because 
an attacker can eavesdrop the communication 
parties involve in the authentication process 
and can easily analyze the transaction being 
performed by U.
Our proposed scheme
The scheme consists of the following phases: 
mutual authentication, no verification table, 
session key agreement, single registration and 
update password securely. Moreover, the scheme 
achieves the security characteristics described in 
[42, 43]. 
Registration phase
When U desires to be registered by S, U and S 
carry out the following process:
1.  U chooses her ID and PW
2.  U sends (ID, PW) to S through a secure 
channel
3.  S performs the equations (12), (13), (14), and 
(15):
 N = h(ID ⊗ x ⊗ y) (12)
 P = h(ID ⊗ x ⊗ y) ⊗ x ⊗ y (13)
 R = h(ID) ⊗ h(PW) ⊗ h(x) ⊗ h(y) ⊗ h(P) (14)
Generates a random value b
 V = hp(h(ID ⊗ b ⊗ PW)) (15)
4.  S stores b, N, R, V, h(), and hp() in U’s smart 
card
5.  S sends the smart card to U through a secure 
channel
Login phase
When U desires to get access to S, U carries out 
the following process:
1.  U inserts her smart card into the smart card 
reader, and keys her ID and PW
2.  U’s smart card performs the following 
operations: V* = hp(h(ID ⊗ b ⊗ PW)) and 
checks whether V* ?= V holds or not. If 
not, the smart card terminates this session. 
In other case, U’s smart card performs the 
equations (16), (17) and (18):
 C1 = h(ID ⊗ x ⊗ y) ⊗ h(TU) (16)
h(x) ⊗ h(y) ⊗ h(P) = h(ID) ⊗ h(PW) ⊗ R (17)
 where TU denotes U’s current timestamp
C2 = hp(h(h(x) ⊗ h(y) ⊗ h(P) ⊗ h(TU))) (18)
3.  U’s smart card sends the login request 
message (C1, C2, TU) to S
Verification phase
After S receives U’s login request message, S 
carries out the following process:
1. If (TS – TU) > ΔT, where denotes the expected 
valid time interval for transmission delay, 
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then S rejects the login request; in other case, 
S continues with the process
2.  S performs the equations (19), (13) and (18):
 h(ID ⊗ x ⊗ y)* = C1 ⊗ h(TU) (19)
 P* = h(ID ⊗ x ⊗ y)* ⊗ x ⊗ y (13)
C2
* = hp(h(h(x)
* ⊗ h(y)* ⊗ h(P)* ⊗ h(TU))) (18)
3.  If C2
* is equal to the received C2, S accepts 
U’s login request and performs the equations 
(20), (21) and (22):
C3 = hp(h(h(x)
* ⊗ h(y)* 
⊗ h(P)* ⊗ h(TU) ⊗ h(TS)))
(20)
 where TS denotes S’s current timestamp
 SK = h(h(r) ⊗ h(TU) ⊗ h(TS)) (21)
 where r is a random number generated by S
 C4 = C3 ⊗ SK (22)
4.  S sends (TS, C4) to U
 Upon receiving the message (TS, C4), U 
carries out the following process:
5.  U Verifies either TS is invalid or TS = TU
6.  If the verification process of TS is correct, 
U’s smart card computes the equation (20):
C3
* = hp(h(h(x) ⊗ h(y) ⊗ h(P)  
⊗ h(TU) ⊗ h(TS)))
(20)
7. If C3
* is equal to the received C3, U 
successfully authenticates S
8.  U obtains the session key SK computing the 
equation (23):
 SK = C3 ⊗ C4 (23)
Password change phase
When U desires to change PW, U carries out the 
following process:
1.  U inserts its smart card into the smart card 
reader, keys ID and PW, and requests to 
change password
2.  U’s smart card computes V* = hp(h(ID ⊗ b 
⊗ PW)) and checks whether V* ?= V holds 
or not. If not, the smart card terminates 
this session. In other case, U chooses new 
password PWnew
3.  U’s smart card compute Rnew = h(ID) ⊗ 
h(PWnew) ⊗ h(x) ⊗ h(y) ⊗ h(P) and Vnew = 
hp(h(ID ⊗ b ⊗ PWnew)), and then replaces R, 
V with Rnew, Vnew, respectively.
Security analysis of our scheme
In order to prove that the proposed scheme can 
overcome the security weaknesses found in [28], 
a security analysis is presented.
Off-line secret key guessing attack
The security of the proposed scheme is more 
robust than [28] because the attacker needs to 
guess a candidate x* and y* to satisfy P = h(ID ⊗ 
x ⊗ y) ⊗ x ⊗ y and h(x) ⊗ h(y) ⊗ h(P).
Impersonation attack
Suppose that a legal but malicious user intercepts 
a login request message (C1, C2, TU) of the victim 
and it attempts to impersonate U to login S at time 
TV (> TU). The attacker cannot obtain U’s ID and 
P = h(ID ⊗ x ⊗ y) ⊗ x ⊗ y from C1, C2. Moreover, 
if the attacker obtains the victim’s smart card, it 
obtains N = h(ID ⊗ x ⊗ y), R = h(ID) ⊗ h(PW) 
⊗ h(x) ⊗ h(y) ⊗ h(P), V = hp(h(ID ⊗ b ⊗ PW)), 
and b. Unfortunately to the intruder, nobody 
can extract sensitive information from N, R or V 
without the knowledge of the correct ID and PW. 
For that reasons, an impersonation attack will fail 
in the step 3 of the verification phase.
Server spoofing attack
A legal but malicious user cannot impersonate a 
server S. If an attacker intercepts the U’s login 
request message (C1, C2, TU), it cannot computes 
a valid C3.
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User’s anonymity
In this scheme, the anonymity of U is guaranteed 
because the login request message contains 
a dynamic ID. In this case, the privacy of 
U is preserve because until an attacker can 
eavesdrop the communication parties involve in 
the authentication process, it cannot know the 
identity of U, achieving the main contribution of 
the scheme proposed in [19].
Comparison with related works
A security comparison between the proposed 
scheme and related works [19, 21, 28, 38] 
is presented. The comparison included the 
security characteristics described in [42, 43]. All 
comparisons between our proposed scheme and 
related works are described in table 1.
Table 1 Comparison between our scheme and related works
Security characteristics [19] [21] [28] [38] Our scheme
Mutual authentication No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session key agreement No No Yes Yes Yes
Single registration Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Update password securely Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
User’s anonymity Yes No No No Yes
Without verification table Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Table 1 shows that the scheme proposed in 
[19] does not provide mutual authentication, 
making the scheme unfeasible for practical 
implementation. Nowadays, a remote user 
authentication must contain this security 
characteristic. Moreover, table 1 shows that the 
schemes proposed in [19,21] do not establish 
a session key between the user and the server. 
Furthermore, table 1 shows that the schemes 
proposed in [21, 28, 38] do not keep the user’s 
anonymity against an eavesdroppers. This 
means that these schemes do not keep the merits 
described in [19]. Additionally, table 1 shows 
that the scheme proposed in [38] requires that 
the server maintains a verification table for 
storing information about the smart card during 
the registration phase [38]. 
On the other hand, the proposed scheme 
achieved every security characteristic which 
a secure remote user authentication scheme 
should provide.
Conclusions
The security of [28] was analyzed in this paper. 
Although the authors claimed that their scheme 
can resist very well known attacks, it cannot resist 
off-line secret key guessing attack, impersonation 
attack, and server spoofing attack. In order to 
overcome all the security vulnerabilities found 
in [28], an enhancement scheme of [28] is 
proposed. The security analysis of the proposed 
scheme demonstrated that it can resist very 
well known attacks and security comparison 
between the proposed scheme and related works 
demonstrated that the proposed scheme achieves 
all the security characteristics described in [42, 
43], making it more secure.
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